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uring the past two decades, an important
new method of financing large-scale,
high-risk domestic and international
business ventures has emerged. This
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pants—especially Steve Kaplan and Paul Gompers. We also thank Ben Esty, Chris
Cornwell, Michel Habib, Jimmy Hilliard, Larry Lang, Carlos Maquieira, John Martin,
Ashoka Mody, Mitch Petersen, Annette Poulsen, David Schirm, Bill Schwert, Joe
Sinkey, and Art Snow for helpful comments and suggestions. Finally, we are
especially grateful for the financial support of the University of Oklahoma’s Michael
F. Price College of Business, which allowed us to purchase the Loanware database
used in this study.
1. If project finance is defined more generally as limited recourse financing
of stand-alone projects, Kensinger and Martin quite rightly point out that this
financing technique predates stocks or bonds by several centuries. The “modern”
form of PF—using a separately-incorporated vehicle company (governed by
British or U.S. commercial law), syndicated loan financing, and sophisticated
contractual allocation of project risks and responsibilities—is, however, a much
more recent invention. See J. Kensinger and J.D. Martin, “Project finance: Raising
Money the Old-Fashioned Way,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 1
(1988), 69-81. The Petrozuata project is described in B. Esty and M.M. Millett,
Petrolera Zuata, Petrozuata C.A., Harvard case number 299012 (Harvard Business
School Press, 1998).
D
technology, called project finance, is usually defined
as limited or non-recourse financing of a newly to be
developed project through the establishment of a
(separately incorporated) vehicle company. Thus
the distinguishing features of project finance (PF)
are, first, that creditors share much of the venture’s
business risk and, second, that funding is obtained
strictly for the project itself without the expectation
that the corporate or government sponsor will co-
insure the project’s debt—or at least not fully.
Project finance was first used on a large scale to
develop the North Sea oil fields during the 1970s,
where the scale and risk of the investment required
far exceeded the capabilities of any single petroleum
company, or even any single consortium of compa-
nies.1 Following the success of the North Sea devel-
opments, PF has been used extensively to develop
natural resource, electric power, transportation, andVOLUME 12 NUMBER 4      WINTER 2000
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numerous other ventures around the world. PF has
been associated with many financial and operating
success stories. These include the Teeside Power
project in the UK, the Ras Laffan LNG project in
Qatar, the Hopewell Partners Guangzhou Highway
in southern China, and the Petrozuata heavy oil
project in Venezuela, as well as numerous indepen-
dent power generation projects in the United States.
However, PF is most closely associated in the public
mind with three spectacular recent financial fail-
ures—the Channel Tunnel (Eurotunnel), the
EuroDisney theme park outside of Paris, and the
Dabhol power project in India. In spite of these
failures, total PF lending worldwide has exceeded
$36 billion every year since 1989, and reached a peak
of $85 billion in 1997 before dropping back to $54
billion during 1998’s global economic turmoil.
Three excellent studies of project finance have
been published in recent years.2 The authors of these
studies assert that PF will most commonly be used
for capital-intensive projects with relatively transpar-
ent cash flows, in riskier-than-average countries,
using relatively long-term financing, and employing
far more detailed loan covenants than convention-
ally-financed projects. One of the three studies—by
Brealey, Cooper, and Habib—also stresses that one
of the key comparative advantages of project finance
is that it allows the allocation of specific project risks
(such as completion and operating risk, revenue and
price risk, and the risk of political interference or
expropriation) to those parties best able to manage
them. To our knowledge, however, no full-scale
empirical study of project finance has yet been
published.3 This paper seeks to remedy this empiri-
cal gap, and has two principal objectives. The first is
descriptive. Using a comprehensive sample of over
90,000 syndicated loans (worth over $13 trillion)
booked on international capital markets since 1980,
we compare the financial characteristics and geo-
graphic and industrial distributions of 4,956 PF loans
with various non-PF loan sub-samples and with the
full sample of all syndicated loans. Second, we
perform statistical (OLS regression) analyses of the
determinants of loan pricing (spreads) for PF and
non-PF loans to determine how borrower and loan-
specific factors influence credit spreads.
THE LOANWARE DATABASE
The principal data source used in this study is
the Loanware database provided by Capital DATA,
a London-based joint venture company between
Euromoney plc and Computasoft Ltd. This database
contains detailed historical information on virtually
the entire population of syndicated loans and related
banking instruments booked on national and inter-
national capital markets from January 1, 1980 through
March 23, 1999. While the file contains information
on both signed and unsigned loans, we examine
only loans that are actually agreed to by the contract-
ing parties (signed loans), though we do include the
roughly one-eighth of all loans that are subsequently
canceled. We also require that the loan size (in $US
millions) be available. After applying these two
screens, we are able to examine a total of 90,784
loans (worth $13.2 trillion), of which 4,956 loans
(worth $634.4 billion) have a loan purpose code of
Project Finance. We verify with Capital DATA that
this screen refers to loans made to a vehicle com-
pany, so we refer to this as our “full project finance
loan sample,” while we call the larger dataset our “all
syndicated loan sample.”
The Industrial and Geographic Distribution of
Project Finance Loans
The full project finance and all syndicated loan
samples are described in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1
presents the industrial distribution of the full sample
of all loans and the project finance sample, while
Table 2 presents the geographic distribution of both
loan samples. Both tables reveal striking differences
between project finance lending and more tradi-
tional syndicated lending, and these differences
largely verify the standard picture of project finance.
Table 1 shows that PF loans are highly concentrated
in five key industries, whereas the general popula-
tion of syndicated loans reveals a far less concen-
trated industrial pattern. No less than 60.2 percent of
all project lending (by value) and 46.3 percent of all
PF loans are made to borrowers in the communica-
tions, mining and natural resources, oil and gas,
electricity and energy utility, and transportation
2. See R.A. Brealey, I.A. Cooper, and M.A. Habib, “Using Project Finance to
Fund Infrastructure Investments,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 9
(1996), 25-38, R.C. Smith and I. Walter, Global Financial Services, (Harper
Business, New York, 1990), 191-281, and the Kensinger and Martin article cited
above.
3. Apart from our own previous study comparing PF in Asia with that in the
West See S. Kleimeier and W.L. Megginson, “A Comparison of Project Finance in
Asia and the West” in Project Finance in Asia:A Redefining of Premises, L.H.G. Lang,
ed. (North Holland Publishing, Amsterdam, 1998) 57-90.10
JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE
(excluding airlines and shipping) industries. These
industries account for only 21.8 percent of all
syndicated lending (value) and a mere 17.1 percent
of all syndicated loans. This finding is consistent with
the received wisdom that project finance is used
primarily to fund tangible-asset-rich and capital
intensive projects with relatively transparent (often
hard-currency) cash flows. This conclusion is rein-
forced by the observation that all of the other “over-
represented” industries for PF lending (i.e., construc-
tion/heavy engineering, hotels and leisure, petro-
chemicals) can be described similarly.
Table 2 also presents a revealing difference
between the countries which attract PF lending and
those where other types of syndicated credits are
directed. Whereas the vast bulk of general syndi-
cated lending is concentrated in the United States
(61.4 percent by value and 56.6 percent of all loans),
only 16.8 percent of PF lending and only 14.7 percent
of PF loans go to U.S. borrowers. The biggest
recipient of PF lending is southeast Asia. This region
accounts for 23.8 percent of the total value—and no
less than 30.3 percent of the total number—of project
finance loans, whereas it accounts for a mere 5.2
percent of the value (and 10.8 percent of the
number) of all syndicated lending. Closer analysis
reveals that PF lending to southeast Asia peaked in
1996, and has fallen dramatically since then, but this
region was the heart and soul of PF lending for
almost a decade prior to that date—with Indonesia
and China being the two favorite target countries.
Intriguingly, U.K. borrowers are more heavily repre-
sented in the PF sample than in the full syndicated
loan sample (14.5 percent by value versus 9.3
percent), although the rest of western Europe ac-
counts for an almost identical fraction (10.3 versus
10.4 percent) of both types of lending. This prefer-
ence of project finance lenders for British borrowers
is not merely an artifact of the disproportionately
large Eurotunnel loans (discussed below). It also
reflects the emphasis placed by the Conservative
Thatcher and Major governments (and now the
Labor government of Tony Blair) on the private
rather than public financing of large infrastructure
TABLE 1     INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECT FINANCE AND ALL SYNDICATED LOANS
Project Finance Loans All Syndicated Loans
Industrial Category Number Total Value of Percent of Number Total Value of Percent of
of Borrower  of Loans Loans US$ Million Total Value of Loans Loans US$ Million Total Value
Commercial & Industrial 3,136 $386,862 61.0 59,612 $8,391,648 63.1
Chemicals, Plastic & Rubber 105 8,891 1.4 2,340 321,100 2.4
Communications 241 51,126 8.1 2,237 510,242 3.8
Construction/Heavy Engineer 222 15,477 2.4 1,434 75,751 0.6
Forest Products/Packaging 135 15,219 2.4 1,988 299,979 2.3
Hotels & Leisure 298 20,628 3.3 1,992 255,184 1.9
Mining & Natural Resources 300 28,030 4.4 1,452 191,219 1.4
Motorway Operator 117 14,642 2.3 342 28,636 0.2
Oil & Gas 631 119,513 18.8 6,061 1,165,320 8.8
Petrochemicals 147 24,975 3.9 470 89,359 0.7
Steel & Aluminum 215 23,488 3.7 2,098 199,275 1.5
Utilities 1,063 $140,609 22.2 4,644 $808,306 6.1
Electricity/Energy Utility 1,009 136,520 21.5 3,942 714,073 5.4
Financial Institutions 167 $21,828 3.4 14,051 $2,461,411 18.5
Transportation 143 $48,677 7.7 5,781 711,028 5.4
Transport (ex. Airlines, Ship) 112 46,788 7.4 1,870 319,180 2.4
Government/Agencies 399 $30,602 4.8 3,979 674,869 5.1
Government/Authority 302 23,333 3.7 2,463 488,359 3.7
Other 48 $5,844 0.9 2,716 251,211 1.9
Total, All Items 4,956 $634,422 100.0 90,783 $13,298,457 100.0VOLUME 12 NUMBER 4      WINTER 2000
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projects—many of which have proven to be remark-
ably successful, both financially and operationally.
As a whole, these geographic lending patterns are
consistent with the widely held belief that project
finance is a particularly appropriate method of funding
projects in relatively risky (non-OECD) countries.
Characteristics of the Largest Project Finance
Deals
Table 3 presents key details of the 15 largest
project finance loan packages arranged since 1980.
These are listed by the total value of the project, since
some packages have as many as four separate loan
tranches—which are listed separately, with their
corresponding financial information, within each
project’s cell in the table. There are a total of 34 loans
associated with these 15 project finance packages.
The infamous Eurotunnel project has the distinction
of being both the largest and second largest project
financing in history, though the $13.2 billion loan in
June 1990 was only a refinancing of the original $7.9
billion loan package arranged in August 1987. These
15 deals reveal many of the key features commonly
associated with project finance. Project sponsors are
usually well known international operating compa-
nies, state-owned enterprises, and/or governmental
bodies that are joined together through ownership
of the vehicle company and by the supplemental
project financing contractual agreements. Further,
the loans themselves tend to be relatively long-term
credits, and are priced at a fixed spread above a
benchmark interest rate, typically the London Inter-
Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Another distinctive
feature of these loans is that they frequently include
a loan tranche that is fully or partially guaranteed by
a creditworthy third party, usually a developed
country’s export credit agency (though the World
TABLE 2     GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROJECT FINANCE AND ALL SYNDICATED LOANS
Project Finance Loans All Syndicated Loans
Geographic Location Number Total Value of Percent of Number Total Value of Percent of
of Borrower  of Loans Loans US$ Million Total Value of Loans Loans US$ Million Total Value
Supranational 5 $848 0.1 313 $31,896 0.2
North America 850 $126,155 19.9 53,694 $8,623,762 64.9
United States 727 106,561 16.8 51,401 8,169,735 61.4
Western Europe 673 $157,223 24.8 15,173 $2,613,371 19.7
United Kingdom 306 91,751 14.5 6,109 1,230,149 9.3
Eastern Europe 276 $22,046 3.5 1,623 $156,291 1.2
Middle East 501 $59,286 9.3 2,094 $217,619 1.6
Turkey 198 14,468 2.3 813 54,808 0.4
Africa 196 $12,563 2.0 930 $60,549 0.5
Indian Sub Continent 157 $11,729 1.9 967 $58,459 0.4
South East Asia 1,503 $151,004 23.8 9,780 $688,046 5.2
China 450 29,810 4.7 1,467 89,719 0.7
Hong Kong 134 21,689 3.4 1,553 147,766 1.1
Indonesia 260 33,210 5.2 1,392 91,912 0.7
South Korea 120 8,015 1.3 1,662 85,332 0.6
Malaysia 139 17,477 2.8 841 64,965 0.5
Thailand 154 17,748 2.8 1,128 64,867 0.5
Australia & Pacific 246 $37,500 5.9 2,266 $395,197 3.0
Australia 227 36,221 5.7 1,853 349,251 2.6
Latin America 496 $52,342 8.3 3,303 $370,542 2.8
Caribbean 52 $3,646 0.6 596 $78,816 0.6
Other 1 $79 0.01 44 $3,920 0.03
Total, All Items 4,956 $634,422 100.0 90,783 $13,298,457 100.012
JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE
TABLE 3    FINANCIAL DETAILS OF THE TWENTY-FIVE LARGEST PROJECT FINANCE DEALS SINCE 1980
Loan(s) Loan(s) Project Loan Term Spread over LIBOR, Third Party
Launch Date Size/$US M Borrower  Name(s) Location (Years) Basis Points Guarantee
Sponsor Names Loan  Purpose
Jun 90 $13,204 Eurotunnel plc/SA; Eurotunnel Ltd; UK/France 20 yrs 175.0 bp None
Eurotunnel Finance SA
—— Refinancing & increased funding for cross-channel tunnel link
Aug 87 $6,319 Eurotunnel plc/SA UK/France 18 yrs 108.3 bp None
(canc 90) $1,580 18 yrs 141.7 bp
—— Original Eurotunnel financing
Mar 93 $5,530 Formosa Plastics Corp. USA; Nan Taiwan 15 yrs 75.0 bp ——
Ya Plastics Cor.p; Formosa Chemicals
& Fibre; Formosa Pharmaceuticals
—— Construct petro-chemical project and port complex in Yunlin province.
Largest Taiwanese syndicated loan.
Feb 93 $1,995 Qatar Liquified Gas Co. Ltd. Qatar 12 yrs. —— MITI
$1,600 —— —— ——
$300 9 yrs. 70.0 bp COFACE
$170 9 yrs 165.0 bp ——
$100 9 yrs. —— ——
Qatar General Petroleum; Marubeni; LNG project in Qatar. Develop $6 bn North Field Ras Laffan.
Mitsui; Mobil Corp.; TOTAL
Nov 95 $2,598 Railtrack plc UK 5.5 yrs 27.5 bp
$1,102 5.5 yrs 27.5 bp ——
—— General corporate purposes and construct Thameslink 2000 project.
Jan 98 $1,500 NEXTEL Communications USA 8 yrs 200.0 bp ——
$1,195 —— ——
$500 8 yrs 200.0 bp
—— To build firm’s nationwide digital mobile radio network and working capital.
Sep 97 $2,168 Hutchison Telecommunication; UK 8 yrs 100.0 bp ——
$642  Orange plc 8 yrs 100.0 bp
—— Refinancing of earlier project financing.
Jan 97 $2,734 Bouygues Telecom France 10 yrs 130.0 bp ——
Bouygues Decaux Telecom; Bouygues SA; Nationwide rollout of borrower’s mobile phone franchise.
Cable & Wireless; US West; Faber; BNP-Banexi
Jul 96 $1,281 Athens International Airport Greece —— —— HERMES
$1,036 —— ——
 $403 —— ——
—— Construction of new Athens airport.
Aug 97 $1,363 Alliance Pipeline LP Canada 10 yrs 120.0 bp ——
$1,223 10 yrs 120.0 bp
IPL Energy Inc; Westcoast Energy Inc. Construct pipeline to carry natural gas from British Columbia to Chicago hub.
Jan 97 $2,500 Rossijkoje A/O Gazprom Russia  8 yrs 200.0 bp ——
—— Construct pipeline linking Yamal gas fields with Europe.
Mar 92 $770 Castle Peak Power Co. Ltd. Hong Kong 20 yrs 62.5 bp ECGD
$690 13.1 yrs 53.9 bp ——
$500 20 yrs 75.0 bp COFACE
$482 20 yrs —— US EXIM
China Light & Power (CLP Power); Exxon Corp. Construct Black Point Power Station at Castle Peak in Hong Kong.
Nov 93 $1,700 Republic of Korea; Seoul-Pusan Korea 17.5 yrs 75.0 bp COFACE
$720 High-Speed Rail 15 yrs 56.0 bp ——
—— Purchase TGV trains for Seoul-Pusan rail link.
May 97 $1,200 Loy Yang Power Projects Pty Ltd Australia 15 yrs —— ——
$581 10 yrs ——
 $387 6 yrs ——
$232 —— ——
CMS Generation Co; NRG Energy Inc Purchase of Loy Yang Power Station, coal mine & other assets from Loy
Yang, wholly-owned by state of Victoria.
Jun 90 $2,324 Midland Cogeneration Venture LP USA 25 yrs —— ——
CMS Energy; Dow Chem.; Fluor; Panhandle Eastrn.; Coastal Corp. Construct 1,370 MW cogeneration facility in Midland, MI.VOLUME 12 NUMBER 4      WINTER 2000
13
Bank is a frequent guarantor of smaller PF loans in
this database).
Perhaps the most telling difference between the
large PF loans detailed in Table 3 and more tradi-
tional syndicated credits is the use to which they are
put. Whereas most non-PF loans are arranged to
finance acquisitions or LBOs, to refinance existing
financing facilities, or for general corporate purposes,
all of the large PF loan packages are associated with
specific construction projects—though two are refi-
nancing of earlier credits. Among the 15 PF loans, we
find—parallel to Table 1—that the main applications
of PF is in communication, transportation, and power.
Once again, the received wisdom regarding project
finance rings true: at least the largest such loan pack-
ages are complex, international financial deals in-
volving a vehicle company owned by multiple spon-
sors, and are arranged to fund development of large,
tangible-asset-based projects. The loans are often
guaranteed by third parties (though the entire pack-
age rarely is—only individual loan tranches), and the
projects are often located in relatively risky coun-
tries. We now turn to a direct comparison of PF loans
with various subsamples of non-PF loans, catego-
rized by their intended use.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PROJECT FINANCE
VERSUS NON-PROJECT FINANCE LOANS
Panel A of Table 4 presents basic financial
characteristics for the full sample of all syndicated
loans, the full sample of PF loans, and four addi-
tional, non-overlapping samples of syndicated loans
classified by loan purpose. The category of corporate
control (CC) loans are arranged to fund acquisitions,
leveraged buyouts, or employee stock option plans.
Capital structure (CS) loans are those booked in
order to repay maturing lines of credit or for recapi-
talizations, share repurchases, debtor in possession
financing, standby commercial paper support, or
other (unspecified) refinancing. Fixed asset based
(FAB) loans are intended for mortgage lending or to
fund purchases of aircraft, property, or shipping. The
general corporate purpose (GCP) loans category in-
cludes loans with that as their stated purpose, as well
as credits with an empty loan purpose code. Loans
with other purposes are not grouped here into a
separate category, though they are included in the
full sample of syndicated loans.4 This categorization
strategy, though admittedly ad hoc, effectively groups
together loans having similar corporate purposes
and provides a manageable set of loan type samples
that can be directly compared to each other.
Panel A of Table 4 reveals striking—and highly
significant—differences both between PF and non-
PF loans, as well as between the various categories
of non-PF loans. One of the most dramatic findings
is how much larger are CC and CS loans than other
loan types. These credits have mean (median) values
of $212 million ($59 million) and $209 million ($65
million), respectively, as compared to $146 million
($50 million) for the full population of all syndicated
loans and a “mere” $88 million ($50 million) for FAB
loans. The converse of this result is the surprising
finding that PF loans are, on average, $18 million
smaller than the general population of syndicated
loans ($128 million versus $146 million), though the
median PF loan size is $2 million greater ($52 million
versus $50 million). These relative size differences
remain even when size is expressed as the total value
of all loan tranches rather than as individual loans.
While the size difference between PF and CC loans
can perhaps be explained away by stressing that the
latter involves purchasing an entire company, the
fact remains that PF loans are not abnormally large
financing vehicles—but rather fall well within the
mainstream of syndicated lending.
According to all four of the remaining variables in
Table 4’s Panel A, however, PF loans are substantially
different financial instruments. The average maturity of
PF loans, 8.6 years, is almost twice that of the full
population of syndicated loans, and is comparable
only to the 8.1 year average of FAB loans. Additionally,
compared to the overall sample of syndicated loans
and most of the sub-samples, PF loans are more than
twice as likely to be fixed rate credits (13.9 percent
versus 5.9 percent). Further, those PF loans that are
priced as a floating rate use LIBOR as a pricing base far
less frequently (38.8 percent) than the full syndicated
loan sample (69.5 percent).5 Perhaps the single most
4. We also grouped these credits into an “Other loans” sample, and subjected
these to the same basic tests as the five principal categories. This sample was very
similar to our GCP loans sample in general characteristics, so we do not report these
tests here in the interests of space. These results are available upon request.
5. After LIBOR, the next most common bases for pricing project finance loans
are the Singapore and Hong Kong Inter-Bank Offered Rates (SIBOR and HIBOR),
with 118 and 82 loans, respectively. A surprisingly large number of 1,830 PF loans
list a spread, in basis points (thus confirming they are floating rate credits), but do
not specify the base against which the loan is priced. Running our main analyses
with these classified as LIBOR-based loans yields qualitatively similar results.14
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remarkable difference between PF and all non-PF
loans is how infrequently PF loans are extended to U.S.
borrowers. Whereas American corporations (and oc-
casionally governmental units) arrange 55.8 percent of
all syndicated loans, by value, and account for fully 74.0
percent of CS lending, U.S. borrowers account for a
mere 13.9 percent of PF lending. The only other
category of loans with a similar non-U.S. flavor are the
FAB credits, which we will find share many important
characteristics with PF loans.
Loan Pricing Samples
One of the most important objectives of this
study is to determine whether PF loans are more or
less expensive for borrowers than other types of
TABLE 4     CHARACTERISTICS OF PROJECT FINANCE VERSUS OTHER SYNDICATED LOAN SAMPLES*
All Project Corporate General Capital Fixed
Syndicated Finance Control Corporate Structure Asset
Variable of Interest Loans Loans Loans Purpose Loans Loans Based Loans
PANEL A: ALL LOANS WITH $US AMOUNT AVAILABLE
Number of Loans 90,784 4,956 10,795 39,653 25,313 4,680
Total Volume, $USm 13,229,278 634,422 2,292,431 4,275,803 5,289,793 410,175
Loan Size, $USm: avg 146 128 212 108 209 88
Median 50 52 59 39 65 50
Minimum 0.003 0.011 0.067 0.003 0.012 0.050
Maximum 15,000 13,204 14,000 7,737 15,000 4,330
Average Maturity, Years 4.8 8.6 5.1 4.5 3.9 8.1
Loans with Fixed Price (%) 5.9 13.9 2.7 4.9 3.9 6.2
Loans Priced vs LIBOR (%) 69.5 38.8 84.6 66.2 70.8 72.5
Loans to US Borrowers (%) 55.8 13.9 68.8 50.3 74.0 20.4
PANEL B: HIGH-INFORMATION LOANS WITH SPREADS VERSUS LIBOR
Number of Loans* 40,073 1,824 6,266 15,617 13,464 1,468
Total Volume, $USm * 8,120,791 322,870 1,709,683 2,038,268 3,759,693 130,824
Loan Size, $USm: avg 203 177 273 131 279 109
Median* 70 70 85 50 100 60
Average Number of Tranches 1.7 2.0 2.4 1.4 1.7 1.5
Avg Spread over LIBOR, bp 134 130 195 113 135 86
Average Maturity, Years 4.8 8.6 5.2 4.6 4.1 7.7
Avg No. of Syndicate Banks 10.7 14.5 11.9 9.4 11.5 9.6
Average Fee Levels, bp
Initial Commitment Fee 30.8 36.9 39.5 28.0 30.8 20.2
Max Participation Fee 36.9 56.3 56.1# 30.7 31.6 37.2
Loans in US Dollars (%) 86.8 77.7 84.5 85.6 90.6 78.9#
Loans to US Borrowers (%) 56.9 11.6 76.8 44.3 74.3 13.4#
Loans with Currency Risk (%) 33.1 72.9 10.5 45.3 18.2 71.0#
Loans with Covenants (%) 30.5 3.4 41.6 21.3 42.4 7.1
Average Country Risk Score* 90.0 74.6 95.4 87.3 94.1 82.7
Average Country Risk Rank 12.8 31.8 5.2 16.3 7.4 21.3
Loans with Guarantees (%) 13.3 34.1 6.8 14.3 9.9 34.5#
Loans to Collateralizeable 14.2 27.7 8.5 12.4 11.9 69.5
Asset-rich Borrowers (%)
*Panels A and B present financial details for the full sample of all syndicated loans, plus five sub-samples categorized by loan purpose code. In panel B, #  indicates
that based on a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances, the difference between the value for this loan type and the value for project finance loans is not significant
at the 5% significance level. All other values are statistically significant at the 5% level or higher. * indicates that the t-test has not been applied to these variables.VOLUME 12 NUMBER 4      WINTER 2000
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loans. To address this issue, we select from the
sample of all syndicated loans those credits which
are both priced as floating rate loans and which use
LIBOR as a base interest rate. We also screen for
complete data on borrower nationality and loan
currency denomination. These screens yield a set of
“high-information” loan samples with comparable
pricing data expressed, in basis points, as spreads
above LIBOR. These are presented in Panel B of
Table 4, beginning with the full sample of 40,073
high-information syndicated loans. The various loan
purpose sub-samples are presented next, beginning
with the 1,824 project finance loans priced as a
spread over LIBOR.6
In addition to the variables discussed earlier,
Table 4’s Panel B presents several new loan structure
variables as well as greater detail about borrowers
and the use for which a loan is arranged. Most of
these are self-explanatory (i.e., fee levels, number of
banks in a syndicate, loans with guarantees), but a
few require definition. We define a loan as having
currency risk if the denomination of the loan (and its
currency of repayment) differs from the currency of
the borrower’s home country. Thus a Japanese
borrower arranging a dollar loan would be subject
to currency risk, whereas that same borrower arrang-
ing a yen-denominated loan would not be. Country
risk rank and country risk score are taken directly
from the semi-annual country risk tabulation in
Euromoney magazine. A low-risk country will have
a very low rank but a very high score. While we
report both risk rank and risk scores in Panel B, in
the interest of space we later report only empirical
results using country risk rank data, since this is the
only risk measure reported by Euromoney during the
1980-1982 period.
The variable loans with covenants indicates
whether the loan agreement legally imposes any of
the standard positive or negative covenants on the
borrower. Since this variable suffers from a missing
value problem (that is, an empty cell may mean
either that the loan has no covenants or that the data
is unavailable), we report it simply as the fraction of
each loan type with covenants included. Finally, the
variable loans to collateralizeable asset-rich borrow-
ers is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the borrower
is operating in an industry generally believed to be
rich in non-specialized, tangible (and thus
collateralizeable) assets. Specifically, this means that
the loan recipient has a business borrower code of
airlines, apartment management, electricity utility,
hotels and leisure, property, REIT, or shipping. Both
the theoretical and empirical capital structure litera-
ture suggests that companies with many such assets
should be able to tolerate heavier debt levels than
other companies. 7 Panel B of Table 4 also shows—
based on t-tests comparing the values of each
variable in the high-information PF loan sample with
the corresponding values in the (high-information)
all syndicated loan sample and in the other four loan
purpose sub-samples—that almost all differences
between the PF sample values and the correspond-
ing values for other loan categories are statistically
significant.8
Most of the non-price variables detailed in Panel
B clearly suggest that PF loans are often similar to
fixed asset based loans (FAB), but are otherwise
fundamentally different financial instruments from
other loan types. As before, a far lower fraction of
both PF and FAB loans are arranged for U.S. borrow-
ers (11.6 and 13.4 percent) than is true for the overall
sample of all syndicated loans (56.9 percent), and
these loans also have much longer average maturity
(8.6 and 7.7 years versus 4.8 years). Additionally, PF
and FAB loans are much more likely to be subject to
currency risk than are other loan types (72.9 and 71.0
percent for PF and FAB loans, respectively, versus
33.1 percent for all syndicated loans). Given the non-
U.S. nature of typical PF and FAB borrowers, coupled
with the fact that syndicated loans are overwhelm-
ingly dollar-denominated, this high level of currency
risk is not surprising. Furthermore, a significantly
larger fraction of PF and FAB loans carry third-party
guarantees (34.1 and 34.5 percent, respectively) than
of the full sample of all syndicated loans (13.3 per-
cent) or any other sub-sample.
PF and FAB loans share one other intriguing
(and surprising) common feature—they are far less
6. This number will be further reduced depending on the availability of the
country risk rank and score data. The relatively low “survival rate” of PF loans from
the full sample to the high-information sub-sample (36.8 percent of the original
4,956 loans) is due to their pricing characteristics. PF loans are more commonly
fixed price credits than are other types of loans and fewer of the floating rate PF
loans are priced versus LIBOR. Nonetheless, a comparison of the variables
common to the loan samples in Panels A and B reveals that the high-information
PF loans in Panel B are not dissimilar to their counterparts in Panel A in terms of
average loan size, maturity, and frequency of U.S. borrowers. The same is true for
the other loan type sub-samples, so we will assume that any empirical results
derived from the high-information sub-samples are generalizeable to the larger
population of all loans.
7. See especially Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim, 1984, On the existence of an optimal
capital structure: Theory and evidence. Journal of Finance 39, 857-878.
8. The actual values of the t-test are available from the authors upon request.16
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likely to contain loan covenants than are all other
loan types. Only 3.4 percent of PF loans, and 7.1
percent of FAB loans, have at least one positive or
negative loan covenant versus 30.5 percent of all
syndicated credits and 42.4 percent of capital struc-
ture loans. We are frankly at a loss to explain why
FAB loans have so few covenants—unless these are
primarily mortgages, specifically tied to individual
assets, which give creditors senior enough positions
not to require separate loan covenants. We can,
however, offer two possible explanations for the
absence of covenants for PF loans—which received
wisdom suggests should be loaded with exquisitely
detailed contractual provisions. First, since this data-
base details PF loans, rather than the full financial
deals themselves, it is likely that the explicit debt
covenants for PF packages are covered by a separate
contract (the project financing package), so the PF
loans themselves are simply one part of a much
larger deal. No such separate contract governs a
takeover loan or a debt refinancing credit extended
to an operating company, however, so in those cases
the covenants are included in the loans themselves.
The second hypothesis really has greater implica-
tions for general corporate finance than for a PF
study, though the separate incorporation feature of
PF is central to its logic. Since loan covenants are
designed in part to protect the creditor from asset
substitution and other methods of wealth expropria-
tion by the borrower, it follows that these clauses are
far less necessary for loans to a special-purpose
vehicle company than they are for loans made to a
complex, multi-divisional corporation.
For three of the characteristics detailed in Panel
B, PF and FAB loans differ significantly from each
other—though they remain more similar than in
comparison to other loan categories. The first two
such features are the country risk measures. PF loan
borrowers are, on average, located in far riskier
countries than is the case for any other loan category.
The average country risk rank for PF borrowers
(31.8) is significantly higher than the corresponding
value for FAB loans (21.3), and is dramatically higher
than the average risk rank for all syndicated loans
(12.8). Using late-1998 Euromoney scores, this sug-
gests that the typical syndicated loan is arranged for
a borrower in, say, Sweden, while a typical FAB loan
would go to a borrower in Singapore, and a typical
PF credit would be arranged for a company in
Bahrain. Average country risk scores for PF, FAB,
and all syndicated loan borrowers (74.6, 82.7, and
90.0, respectively) tell a similar story, corresponding
as they do to arranging loans for borrowers in Qatar,
Cyprus, and Australia. Clearly, project finance loans
involve significantly greater political and economic
risk than any other major category of syndicated
credit.
Perhaps one reason PF loans can be made to
relatively risky borrowers is because they are much
more likely to be arranged for collateralizeable asset-
rich projects than is the case for the average syndi-
cated loan. Over one-quarter (27.7 percent) of PF
loans are extended for such projects, versus only
14.2 percent of all syndicated loans. On the other
hand, the fraction of FAB loans arranged for this type
of borrower, 69.5 percent, is the highest of any loan
category—but this is not surprising since this cat-
egory is defined as rich in tangible assets.
Finally, the relative pricing of PF versus non-PF
loans is one of the most important, and surprising,
findings detailed in Panel B of Table 4. Average loan
spreads are statistically and economically signifi-
cantly lower for PF loans (130 bp) than they are for
CC loans (195 bp), CS loans (135 bp) and the full
sample of all syndicated loans (134 bp). Many
observers might have predicted that PF loans have
higher spreads than non-PF loans, since loan repay-
ment is not guaranteed by the project’s sponsor
(limited or non-recourse lending) and because of
most projects’ higher perceived risk levels.
Furthermore, the observed level of loan fees
and the number of participating banks do provide
indirect evidence that PF lending may well be
considered relatively more risky than other types of
lending—or at least more difficult to arrange. The
average levels of commitment and participation fees
for PF loans (36.9 and 56.3 bp, respectively) are
significantly higher than the levels for the full sample
of syndicated loans (30.8 and 36.9 bp), as well as for
every sub-sample except corporate control loans.
Additionally, the average number of banks partici-
pating in PF loans (14.5 banks) is significantly larger
than the average for all loans (10.7 banks) and the
average for every other loan sub-sample. These
findings suggest that banks must be compensated
with relatively high up-front fee payments to entice
them to participate in project finance lending, and
they are apparently unwilling to take as large a stake
in PF loans as they would in other credits. Either that
or they wish to increase the number of banks
participating in a PF credit of a given size in order to
spread risks over a larger number of banks for someVOLUME 12 NUMBER 4      WINTER 2000
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other reason, such as to build political support. We
will examine loan pricing more fully in the next
section, when we employ OLS regression to deter-
mine what factors influence loan spreads.
Before proceeding, we should briefly summa-
rize the results of our univariate comparisons be-
tween PF loans and other loan types. Project finance
loans fall, on average, in the middle range of all
syndicated lending in terms of size and loan spread
(price). On the other hand, PF loans have much
longer average maturity and are more likely to be
fixed rather than floating rate credits (and are less
likely to be priced relative to LIBOR if they are
floating rate). American companies use project fi-
nance sparingly; whereas over half of all syndicated
loans are arranged for U.S. borrowers, only one-
eighth of PF loans are booked for American vehicle
companies. In fact, the average PF loan borrower
resides in a much riskier country than is true for
syndicated lending in general, and PF lending is
significantly more likely to be arranged for a tangible
asset rich project. Finally, PF loans share many
similarities with FAB credits—such as borrower
nationality, average loan size and maturity, frequent
use of third-party guarantees, and infrequent use of
loan covenants. On the other hand, they also differ
in being more expensive than FAB loans and in
being extended to relatively riskier and less tangible-
asset rich borrowers.
LOAN PRICING REGRESSIONS
In this section, we subject the various high-
information loan samples detailed in Table 4, Panel
B to OLS regression analysis. Our purposes in doing
this are two-fold. First, we wish to determine which
of the variables detailed in Table 4 have significant,
independent influences on loan spreads once the
effects of other variables are accounted for. Second,
we wish to determine whether PF loans are more or
less expensive than other types of loans—again,
after accounting for other factors. The academic
literature contains numerous examples of loan pric-
ing studies using both bank loans and publicly-
traded debt. The loan pricing tests we perform are
most similar to those presented in a study by J. R.
Booth, both in the actual model estimated and in the
average size of loans under examination.9 Our
sample size, however, is many times larger than that
used in Booth’s or almost any other study.
We estimate the determinants of loan pricing
using the model described in equation 1. The
dependent variable is the loan spread above LIBOR,
in basis points, and the independent variables are
those presented and discussed in Table 4. We
employ standard OLS regression estimation.10 The
model estimated is:
Spread = + 1 Size + 2 Maturity + 3 Guarantee +
4 Currency Risk + 5 Country Risk Rank +
6 Collateralizeable Assets (1)
where:
Size = Loan size, in US$ millions;
Maturity = Loan maturity, in years;
Guarantee = Dummy variable taking the value of
1 if a loan has a third-party repayment guarantee and
0 otherwise;
Currency Risk = Dummy variable taking the value
of 1 if a loan is exposed to currency risk (the currency
of the loan repayment cash flows differs from the
borrower’s home country currency), and 0 other-
wise;
Country Risk Rank = Country risk rank, an integer
ranking of country risk provided by Euromoney
every year, where low risk countries have low ranks
and high risk countries have high ranks;
Collateralizeable Assets = Dummy variable taking
the value of 1 if the borrower is in an industry
generally considered to be rich in collateralizeable
(tangible, non-specialized) assets, and 0 otherwise.
We employ country risk rank , rather than risk
score, as our measure of country risk both because
this yields two additional years of data, and because
this measure increases with country risk—which
lends itself to a more logical interpretation of the
coefficient on the risk variable coefficient. For ex-
ample, if rank’s coefficient value is 1.50, this implies
that a loan booked to a borrower in a country with
a risk ranking of 40 will on average have a spread 15
basis points higher than a loan to a borrower in a
country with a rank of 30.
9. See J.R. Booth, “Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the Cross Monitoring
Hypothesis,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 31 (1992), 25-41.
10. Our model adjusts for heteroskedasticity using the methodology proposed
by White. See H. White, “A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix
Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity,” Econometrica, Vol. 48 (1980),
817-838.18
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We should also explicitly state that this model
does not have a variable measuring credit risk in any
direct way—such as borrower solvency, liquidity, or
leverage ratios—despite the likelihood that such a
proxy would prove very useful. There are two
reasons for this. First, the Loanware database does
not provide a machine readable identification code
(i.e., CUSIP or Datastream identification number)
for borrowers, so there is no feasible method of
matching borrowers to their corresponding account-
ing or stock price data. Second, it is not at all clear
that debt or liquidity ratios for PF borrowers would
be comparable to similar ratios for borrowers of
other syndicated loans. Whereas the borrower of all
other types of syndicated credits is usually an
operating company, which promises its entire faith
and credit to repayment of the loan, the PF borrower
is, by definition, a vehicle company without external
assets or sources of repayment. Thus the implied
corporate backing for a syndicated loan to, say,
Enron is fundamentally stronger than the backing for
a loan to a vehicle company being sponsored by
Enron—even if Enron is the sole project sponsor.
Other things equal, this lack of corporate guarantee
of loan repayment should make these loans riskier
and thus more expensive than other types of loans.
The key question we hope to answer is whether the
project financing structure is sufficiently good at
overcoming agency problems, and/or at reducing
contract monitoring and enforcement costs, to over-
come this lack of corporate backing. If so, PF loans
will not be more expensive than other loan catego-
ries—and may even have lower spreads.
Table 5 presents the results of estimating equa-
tion 1 for all syndicated loans followed by separate
regressions for each loan type. The regression
intercepts for each loan sample are comfortingly
close to the univariate loan price (spread) averages
presented in Panel B of Table 4, and also show
similar relative patterns (highest for CC, lowest for
FAB loans). The intercept for PF loans, 131.4 basis
points, is in fact less than two basis points different
from the average spread presented in Table 4’s Panel
B (130 bp). The PF intercept is also the second lowest
of any loan sample. This finding, coupled with the
univariate test results showing that PF loans have
significantly lower spreads than other loan groups,
clearly suggests that project finance lending has
competitive advantages over other loan forms—at
least for funding certain projects.
The second line of Table 5 details the influence
of loan size on spreads, which is insignificant for
project finance but negative and significant for all
other loan samples. The coefficient values for size on
non-PF loans ranges from –0.02 to –0.06, with an
average of –0.04 for all syndicated loans. This
suggests that increasing the size of a non-PF syndi-
cated loan by $100 million actually reduces[ok?]
TABLE 5     LOAN PRICING REGRESSIONS FOR DIFFERENT LOAN SAMPLES
All Syndicated Corporate Capital Fixed Asset General Corporate Project
Loan Type Loans Control Structure Based Purpose Finance
Number of Observations 39798 6258 13428 1449 15429 1803
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.17
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:
Intercept 150.93 160.28 148.32 104.07 140.13 131.37
(142.39) (36.63) (77.66) (20.54) (85.20) (20.94)
Loan Size (US$m) –0.04 –0.04 –0.05 –0.02 –0.06 –0.01
(–19.27) (–9.24) (–15.36) (–4.07) (–12.62) (–1.33)
Maturity (Years) 2.82 9.11 3.12 0.11 0.68 –0.89
(16.88) (12.82) (8.85) (0.21) (2.47) (–2.00)
Guarantee (0/1) –9.26 –19.54 –3.70 –5.44 –3.98 –42.67
(–7.22) (–4.16) (–1.41) (–1.68) (–2.22) (–11.27)
Currency Risk (0/1) –103.88 –62.11 –94.54 –57.99 –98.87 –42.16
(–74.61) (–13.55) (–37.36) (–11.52) (–47.59) (–6.95)
Country Risk Rank 1.24 1.23 0.76 0.59 1.51 1.50
(25.80) (4.63) (7.23) (4.09) (21.77) (10.87)
Collateralizable Assets (0/1) –14.45 –17.42 –11.91 20.50 –6.59 15.99
(–11.36) (–4.09) (–4.63) (5.05) (–3.33) (3.75)VOLUME 12 NUMBER 4      WINTER 2000
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the required loan spread by an average of 4 basis
points. This negative size/spread relationship could
be due to economies of scale in arranging non-PF
syndicated credits, or it could be due to better known
and more creditworthy borrowers being able to
arrange larger loans. Since size is not a significant
influence on PF loan prices, we do not attempt a
further analysis here. Clearly, however, this finding
merits further study.
Loan term is a second variable that behaves
differently for project finance than for any other loan
type. Whereas spread and maturity are significantly
positively related for all other loan categories, they
have a significant negative relationship for PF loans.
The coefficient value for term indicates that booking
a loan with an original maturity one year longer than
the median reduces the average project finance loan
spread by 0.89 basis points. A one-year increase in
maturity would increase spreads for other loan
categories—by up to 9.1 basis points for corporate
control loans. Since PF loans have an average (and
median) maturity that is more than twice that of most
other loan types, this result is readily explainable
(without a negative spread/term relationship, long
tenor loans would be prohibitively expensive),
though still surprising.
While finding a consistently significant negative
relationship between spread and guarantee across
all loan samples is not surprising, the dispersion in
coefficient values definitely is. Whereas the presence
of a third-party guarantee reduces the spread on a
typical capital structure loan by only 3.7 basis points,
a similar guarantee reduces the spread on project
finance loans by almost 43 basis points. No other
loan category has nearly this sensitivity to third-party
guarantees; the next highest value, -19.6 basis points
for corporate control, is less than half as large. This
result also shows why PF borrowers are so much
more willing than most other borrowers to incur the
cost (in time, effort, and cash) required to arrange
guarantees. The payoff, in terms of a reduced loan
price, is much larger.
In yet another surprise, the currency risk dummy
has a significantly negative relationship with loan
spreads for every loan category. This finding sug-
gests that a mismatch in the currency of the borrower’s
home country and the currency of loan repayment
significantly reduces the rate charged on an average
loan—by 42 basis points for PF credits and by up to
99 basis points for general corporate purpose loans.
One obvious interpretation of this finding is that
banks offer lower rates to international borrowers
who are willing to accept the risk of borrowing in
dollars or another hard currency, though it is not
clear why this would not be offset by increasing
borrower default risk.
The final variable in Table 5, collateralizeable
assets, is always significant—though it has a negative
relationship with spread for CC, GCP, and CS loans,
and a positive relationship with spreads for PF and
FAB credits. This means that, for most loans, a
borrower in a collateralizeable asset-rich industry
will be charged a lower interest rate than will
borrowers in other industries, but the reverse is true
(with roughly equal force) for PF and FAB lending.
The negative coefficient for most loans is what we
expected—tangible assets should generally support
debt better than other types of assets. The positive
relationship for PF and FAB could have two expla-
nations. First, it could result from the fact that these
types of loans are already concentrated upon fund-
ing tangible-asset-rich projects, and that the specific
industries chosen as “collateralizeable” happen to be
relatively riskier than average. Alternatively, it may
simply be that riskier projects can be funded using
PF or FAB loans than could otherwise be arranged.
This is consistent with other loan pricing studies,
which document that the use of collateral is posi-
tively related to loan spreads.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study compares the financial characteris-
tics of a large sample of limited recourse PF loans to
a comparison sample of syndicated loans, as well as
to various sub-samples of non-PF credits classified
by loan purpose. Collectively, these samples repre-
sent almost the entire population of large syndicated
bank loans booked on international capital markets
since 1980—over 90,000 loans in total, with an
aggregate value in excess of $13 trillion. We find that
PF loans differ significantly from non-PF credits in
that PF loans have a longer average maturity, are
more likely to have third-party guarantees, and are
far more likely to be extended to non-US borrowers
and to borrowers in riskier countries. PF credits also
involve more participating banks, have fewer loan
covenants, are more likely to use fixed-rate rather
than floating-rate loan pricing, and are more likely to
be extended to borrowers in tangible-asset-rich
industries such as oil and gas, real estate, and electric
utilities.20
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Despite being non-recourse finance, float-
ing-rate PF loans have lower credit spreads (over
LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans.
This result, surprising in some respects, is striking
evidence that the project financing structure solves
important agency costs that are inherent in the
creditor/borrower relationship, and that PF is a
very effective method of providing monitoring for
large projects with relatively transparent cash
flows. Also contrary to expectations, we find that
PF loans are not larger than non-PF loans, but are
in fact significantly smaller than CC or CS loans
(two of the four non-PF loan samples examined).
Though PF and (most) non-PF loans are all
syndicated bank credits, our univariate compari-
sons suggest that project finance loans differ
rather fundamentally from non-PF credits in al-
most every important aspect.
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